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FIVE CENTURIES OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN
INDIA
The institutions perspective
Sambit Bhattacharyya
Introduction
India’s rapid economic progress over the past two decades has attracted a lot of attention from
academic economists, development practitioners and policymakers. Indeed, the Indian economy
has been growing at a steady pace since the 1980s (see Figure 3.1). Not surprisingly, much of
the emphasis of the academic as well as the policy debates are on the causes of this turnaround.
However, the vast gap between the living standards in India and in the developed world goes
relatively unnoticed. Figure 3.1 illustrates that, even though there has been a steady increase in
per capita GDP in India, it has had little eﬀect on the gap between India and the United States
or the United Kingdom. It also shows that the gap between countries is persistent and that
there is very little change in relative positions since 1950.1
The origin of this gap, therefore, is certainly not the post-war period of 1950 to 2004. To
locate the origin, we need to look further back. Indeed, Figure 3.2, using data from Maddison
(2004),2 suggests that the origin of the divergence goes back to the 1500s. During the ﬁrst half
of the sixteenth century there appears to have been very little diﬀerence in living standards
between India and the rest of the world. In fact some argue that, during this time, Indian living
standards were superior to the rest of the world (Acemoglu et al., 2002). Why, in spite of this
early advantage, did the Indian economy stagnate for the following four centuries while UK
and US economies surged ahead? Is deindustrialization a factor? What are the root causes
behind two centuries of deindustrialization? Is the mediocre economic performance during the
ﬁrst three decades after independence a consequence of poor institutions or simply bad luck?
What changed after 1991 to cause fortunes to reverse? Answers to these questions are critical in
improving our understanding of the process of economic growth not just in India but also in
other developing countries. It is also extremely important as economic growth has the potential
to pull millions out of poverty.
In this chapter, I make an attempt to address these questions using an analytical framework. I
argue that these events are not isolated but, in fact, interconnected, and institutional change
may help us understand why the Indian economy took such a course. This is a signiﬁcant
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departure from the existing literature which does look at these events in isolation and puts very
little emphasis on institutions. I make an attempt to present a uniﬁed view of the Indian
growth process by bringing institutions back into the debate. I present my account of the
Indian growth experience as follows. In the next section, I explain how root causes (institutions
and geography) of development aﬀect proximate causes (factor accumulation and productivity
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Figure 3.1 Indian economy in comparative perspective since independence
Note: Real GDP per capita ﬁgures are from Heston et al. (2006: Table 6.2) and measured in PPP 2000
constant US dollars.
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Figure 3.2 Indian economy in comparative perspective over the long run
Note: Real GDP per capita ﬁgures are from Maddison (2004) measured in 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars (Geary, 1958; Khamis, 1969)
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growth). I also review a smallselection of literature on the impact of root causes other than
institutions (in particular, geography) on economic development in India. The following sec-
tion presents an account of institutions and economic performance during the pre-modern
period. Subsequent sections deal with deindustrialisation and how institutions aﬀected that
process, the post independence ‘Hindu rate of growth’ and the post-1980 turnaround. This is
followed by my conclusion.
Institutions as a root cause of development
In a neoclassical growth accounting framework, economic growth is driven by the following
three factors— accumulation of physical capital, accumulation of human capital, and technological
progress. The key question is how do we incorporate the idea of root causes into this frame-
work? For the purpose of this chapter I tend to take the view that institutions are root causes as they
create incentives or disincentives for investments in physical capital, human capital, and technolo-
gical progress which promotes economic development. In other words, root causes inﬂuence
proximate causes (factor accumulation and productivity improvements) which promote eco-
nomic growth. Is this distinction meaningful? The answer is yes. Given a time frame, this dis-
tinction relies on the chain of causation which can provide useful information on the long run
determinants of development. Indeed factor accumulation and policy may impact institutions in
the short run. But institutions outlive short run policy changes and are likely to have a relatively
lasting impact on development. Therefore, for the purpose of this chapter where I am focusing on
the long run, it does make sense to treat institutions as a root cause of economic development.
Factors other than institutions also have an eﬀect on long term development. Sachs et al.
(2002) show that geographical and cultural diﬀerences are an important determinant of across
states economic development in India. Coastal areas and areas near to ocean navigable waterways
are typically more prosperous than the inland. Even though their analysis focuses on the post-
independence economic performance, these factors may as well be reﬂective of the long term
trend. I however choose to focus on the long run impact of institutions in this chapter as this
aspect has not been covered adequately by other authors.
Institutions and growth in India during the pre-modern period
The early modern world witnessed an unprecedented increase in world trade due to the discovery
of the Americas and the sea route to Asia via the Cape of Good Hope. India also beneﬁted
enormously from the integration of the Indian Ocean into the larger network of world trade.
The early half of the sixteenth century witnessed the rise of a trading network where the
European traders exchanged South American bullions (mainly silver) for manufactured goods
and spices from India to be sold in Europe and Africa (Prakash, 2004). This was made possible
by the European conquest of South America and thereby getting access to the lucrative silver
and gold mines of the continent. Vasco da Gama’s arrival in Calicut in 1498 is perhaps the start
of this new era of trade in the Indian Ocean. Soon after Vasco da Gama’s arrival, the Portuguese
Crown did not hesitate to monopolise this trade route and exclude other key European com-
petitors. The exchanges during this time were largely restricted to spices from the Malabar
region in return for precious metals. However this trade pattern changed signiﬁcantly a century
later when the Dutch and later the English successfully challenged the Portuguese monopoly.
Exchanges during this period involved not only spices but also a wide variety of manufactured
goods and textiles. In fact, by 1750 China and India together accounted for 57 per cent of the
world manufacturing output and therefore a substantial share of the world manufacturing
Sambit Bhattacharyya
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exports (Bairoch, 1982). The Dutch East India Company also participated in the intra Indian
Ocean trade.
In spite of the signiﬁcant capital inﬂows to India in the form of precious metals, the growth
dividends were relatively moderate during this time. This, in my view, is largely due to the
institutional weaknesses. Institutions in India during this time ﬁt the following model developed by
North et al. (2009) well. States protected the monopoly power and rents of politically inﬂuential
elites by restricting entry into the courts. These elites (feudal landlords and local rulers) shared a part
of their rent with the state in return.3 The main instrument used by the state to restrict entry was
violence, expropriation of private property, and higher taxes. Entry restrictions were further
reinforced by the caste system which hindered mobility. Therefore, in summary what we
observe are rent seeking states with very weak institutions to constrain the actions of the elite.
Indeed the eﬀective tax rate during the Mughal period was as high as 40 per cent of the total
farm produce which increased to 50 per cent or more during the later periods as the central
authority of the Mughal Empire waned (Raychaudhuri, 1983; Bayly, 1983). The farmers had
very few rights over their land and any dissent would have attracted disproportionate violence
from the local elites and their armies. The artisans and merchants were also no exception to this
treatment. The additional rents captured by the states by taxing trade with the Europeans were
largely spent on conspicuous consumption. Without doubt this created some short term
demand for Indian manufactured goods and textiles. The long run costs of not investing in
public goods, infrastructure, research and development however far outweighs the short
term beneﬁts. In other words, the gains from trade failed to deliver long run growth because
a signiﬁcant proportion of the surplus frittered away in conspicuous consumption. Very little
of the state-appropriated-rent was invested back in public goods which have long term
positive externalities. History took this course because institutions were weak with very
little political power in the hands of the merchants and the mass to constrain the actions of the
elites.
Institutions and deindustrialization in India during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries
Economic historians debate whether India suﬀered deindustrialization during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Roy (2002) argues that Britain’s productivity gains in textile manu-
facturing and the decline in sea freight rates due to world transport revolution made it
increasingly diﬃcult for Indian producers to be competitive in the world market. As a result
Britain ﬁrst captured India’s export market and then the domestic market. Hence India
experienced deindustrialization. In a similar vein, nationalist authors argue that deindustrializa-
tion was a direct consequence of British colonial rule (Dutt, 1906; Nehru, 1947; Dutt, 1992).
For example, Dutt (1992) argues that strong parliamentary lobbying by the British
cotton manufacturers against the import of Indian textiles forced the East India Company to
resort to policies which led to a systematic destruction of the Indian textile industry. He
writes, ‘Even in 1813, witness after witness in the Select Committee of the House of Lords
testiﬁed that free Indian textile imports (of both ﬁner and coarser varieties) would damage
British industry’ (Dutt, 1992: 148–9). The British East India Company resorted to policies of
imposing internal tariﬀs and transit duties on Indian goods, dislocation and direct exploitation
of the artisans, and forceful reduction of market demand to destroy the industry.4 Indian
textiles also lost their overseas market due to the imposition of high import tariﬀs in Britain.
Empirical evidence on deindustrialization, however, is extremely sparse. The majority of the
contributions on this topic rely on a few available employment and output share numbers
Five centuries of economic growth in India
35
Template: Royal C, Font: ,
Date: 07/02/2011; 3B2 version: 9.1.406/W Unicode (May 24 2007) (APS_OT)
Dir: //integrafs1/kcg/2-Pagination/TandF/SAEH/ApplicationFiles/9780415553971.3d
(Clark, 1950; Thorner, 1962; Bagchi, 1976a, 1976b; and Prakash, 2005). Clingingsmith and
Williamson (2008), however, are an exception. They rely on relative price data to show that
indeed India suﬀered from deindustrialization during the eighteenth and the nineteenth
centuries.
The key question, however, is whether deindustrialization was harmful for India’s economic
performance. A simple way to visualize deindustrialization is that of a skilled manufacturing
worker or artisan moving back to the farm. As a result the entire economy becomes reliant on
the farming sector and non-farm contribution to national income declines. Modern observers
regularly point out that economies over reliant on the primary sector are susceptible to global
commodity price shocks and volatility. Bleaney and Greenway (2001) and Hadass and Williamson
(2003) are amongst the early contributions to stress the long-run growth implications of such
instability. Most theories stress the investment channel in looking for connections between
commodity price shocks and growth (Dercon, 2004; Fafchamps, 2004). The story goes as fol-
lows. Poor households ﬁnd it diﬃcult to smooth their expenditures in the face of shocks and
volatility because they are rationed in credit and insurance markets, so they lower investments
and takes fewer risks. Poor ﬁrms ﬁnd it diﬃcult to smooth net returns on their assets, so they
lower investment and take fewer risks. Perhaps most importantly, poor governments whose
revenue sources are mainly volatile customs duties ﬁnd it diﬃcult to smooth public investment
on infrastructure and education in the face of shocks. Lower public investment ensues, and
growth rates fall. In short, theory informs us that commodity price shocks and volatility should
reduce investment and growth in the presence of risk aversion. In addition, negative shocks are
typically followed by severe cuts in investments in health and education in poor countries which
adversely aﬀects long-term human capital accumulation and growth (Jacoby and Skouﬁas, 1997;
Jensen, 2000). Therefore, economies over reliant on the commodity sector are likely to suﬀer
from these shocks and experience lower growth over the long run. Modern evidence seems to
be consistent with the theory. Using data from 92 countries between 1962 and 1985, Ramey
and Ramey (1995) found that higher volatility leads to lower mean growth. This result is
conﬁrmed for a more recent cross-section of countries (Fatás and Mihov, 2006; Poelhekke and
van der Ploeg, 2007; Koren and Tenreyro, 2007; Loayza et al., 2007). Focusing on the period
1870 to 1939 Blattman et al. (2007) show that commodity price shocks and volatility impact
negatively on growth. Bhattacharyya and Williamson (2009) document that the impact of
volatility on growth is not uniform across countries, with the rich European oﬀshoots such as
Australia typically less aﬀected than the poor periphery. Recent research also indicates that
volatility and poor economic performance may be reﬂective of a much deeper institutional
weakness which perhaps causes both (Acemoglu et al., 2003). In light of the evidence pre-
sented above, therefore, it is perhaps fair to conclude that deindustrialization was harmful to
economic growth in India.
The question that follows is why deindustrialization happened in India? An answer to this
question would lead us to the root causes of India’s slow growth during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Clingingsmith and Williamson (2008: 218) argue that Indian manu-
facturing succumbed to both globalization price shocks as well as domestic supply side shocks.
They write,
In sum, our view is that the long run sources of India’s deindustrialization were both
the globalization price shocks due to European productivity advance in manufacturing
(and the induced demand for industrial intermediaries such as cotton and indigo) plus
the negative productivity shocks to Indian agriculture induced by the earlier Mughal
decline and deteriorating climate conditions.
Sambit Bhattacharyya
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They support their argument using evidence from the relative price data, but they ignore the
role of institutions. During the eighteenth century the Mughal empire was on the decline,
which left a large vacuum in Indian polity. Regional powers scrambled to get a fair share of
the vacant territory; confusion and chaos ensued. The eﬀective tax rate under the Mughals was
already as high as 40 per cent of total farm produce. But, amid this confusion and endemic
local warfare, regional powers went into revenue farming and increased the tax rate to 50 per
cent or more (Raychaudhuri, 1983; Bayly, 1983). This was a rent-seeking institution at its
worst. The eﬀect was predictable. Farm productivity declined as households were often
left with very little savings to invest in the next season. Therefore grain prices increased and
grain wages declined throughout the eighteenth century (Mukherjee, 1939; Broadberry and
Gupta, 2005), which had a devastating impact on manufacturing as the farming sector became
more attractive for workers relative to manufacturing. This eﬀect was further aggravated by
frequent droughts.
During the nineteenth century Indian manufacturing faced another major shock. Globalization
forces in the form of a decline in sea freight rates and a boost in productivity of British man-
ufacturing made it increasingly impossible for Indian textile to be competitive in the world
market. Faced with higher costs and lack of innovation, Indian manufacturing ﬁrst surrendered
its export markets to Britain and then the domestic market. The decline of the domestic
market was further precipitated by the decline of the royal courts, which were major con-
sumers of local goods. The rent-seeking nature of institutions remained intact all throughout
this period. Feuding courts were so engaged in local warfare that they paid very little attention
to infrastructure investments and technological progress which may have had positive external-
ities. Being a subject of revenue farming, individual economic agents also had very little savings
to invest in their machines or import technology that would allow them to withstand British
competition. The result was a steady decline of manufacturing during the nineteenth century.
These rent-seeking institutions persisted even after the British Crown formally took control
from the British East India Company in 1858. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) show that in a majority
of areas the colonial administration handed over proprietary rights in land to landlords rather
than cultivators. This in eﬀect made revenue farming legal under the colonial administration.5
Furthermore, the absolutist nature of the colonial administration and the lack of democratic
representation for the local farmers and artisans made it impossible to constrain the actions of
the colonizers, which facilitated persistence of these extractive institutions. Indeed they ﬁnd
that the long-term development consequences of these extractive institutions are signiﬁcant.
Areas where landlords have the proprietary rights in land produce signiﬁcantly worse outcomes
in terms of agricultural investments, productivity, health investments and education investments
than areas where cultivators have those proprietary rights.
In summary, I argue that Indian manufacturing suﬀered shocks both from within and
outside. They were political shocks resulting from the decline of the Mughal empire, climate
shocks and globalization shocks resulting from lower transport costs and European productivity
increases. Indian manufacturing succumbed to these shocks because of weak and extractive
institutions.6 Deindustrialization ensued and the Indian economy experienced virtual stagnation
during the eighteenth and the nineteenth century.
Colonial hangover, institutions and the post independence ‘Hindu
rate of growth’ in India
India’s ﬁrst Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a staunch critique of the colonial administration
and held the view that deindustrialization was a direct consequence of British colonial rule
Five centuries of economic growth in India
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(Nehru, 1947). So it is not surprising that he emphasized import substitution and the public
sector after assuming power in 1947. His support for the public sector was inherited from the
dramatic and awe-inspiring developments in the then Soviet Union, though, politically, he was
a liberal and believed in democratic ideals. So he supported democratic institutions and universal
suﬀrage. The Indian constitution also acknowledged the right of private individuals to own
property. In summary, the institutional structure of post-independence India was akin to any
other advanced capitalist country with property rights, universal suﬀrage and a free press. In
spite of a start with strong institutions, India experienced extremely slow growth over three
decades post independence. India’s growth rate in per capita income over the period 1950 to
1980 was as low as 1.7 per cent (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004). This phenomenon is com-
monly known as the ‘Hindu rate of growth’ — a term coined by the eminent Indian economist
Raj Krishna to describe India’s slow growth.
What went wrong? The answer may lie in the quality and nature of India’s regulatory
institutions. The import substitution industrialization policy relied on high tariﬀ and quota restric-
tions to prevent imports. This was to protect domestic investments from foreign competition
through imports. Furthermore, private sector investments were discouraged and the government
implemented a development plan where the public sector would play a major role.7 Five-year
plans akin to socialist economic systems were implemented. To discourage the development of
a private sector, the government of the time implemented a meticulously designed regulatory
system. The shared beliefs amongst policy makers and politicians around that time were that:
 India was a capital scarce country and therefore capital needed to be conserved;
 the private sector and the market mechanism were not ideal in deciding where and how
capital should be invested, as private individuals are short-sighted and only care about private
beneﬁts. They are not able to foresee the long-term positive externalities or social beneﬁts
of investments in infrastructure and human capital. Therefore aggregating private beneﬁts
resulting from private investments will always be less than the net social beneﬁt achievable
in the presence of externalities.
 Social planners, the government and the public sector could minimize this net social loss by
directing capital to its highest valued use over the long run which may not have been
obvious to the myopic private investor.
As a result every private investment had to go through scrutiny (a tedious process of licensing) to
prevent wastage of capital. The process of licensing is also commonly known as the ‘license raj’.
The consequence of these regulatory institutions is well known. It led to a culture of wide-
spread rent seeking described by Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and Krueger (1974) as the problem
of ‘rent-seeking society’.
In summary, after independence India experienced sluggish economic growth largely due to
weak regulatory institutions. The negative impact of near-stiﬂing regulatory institutions on
growth and investments far outweighed the positive eﬀects of strong property rights and political
institutions. This is in line with the cross-national evidence reported by Bhattacharyya (2009a)
where he shows that over regulation leads to slower growth in a country even if property
rights and contracting institutions are favourable.
Policy shift, institutional turnaround and growth since the 1980s
Indian economy experienced a turnaround in the 1980s. Growth in per capita income more than
doubled from 1.7 per cent in 1950–80 to 3.8 per cent in 1980–2000 (Rodrik and Subramanian,
Sambit Bhattacharyya
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2004). De Long (2003) and Williamson and Zagha (2002) also note that India’s growth rate
approximately doubled a full decade before the 1991 reforms. In recent years the Indian
economy accelerated even further. What caused this turnaround? Many observers point
towards the reforms of the 1990s as an answer (Bajpai and Sachs, 1999; Ahluwalia, 2002;
Srinivasan and Tendulkar, 2003). But 1980s’ growth cannot be explained by 1990s’ reforms.
Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) argue that the attitudinal change of the government towards
business and industrial establishments kick-started the growth process in the 1980s. To counter
the electoral threat from the Janata Party and reclaim some of her lost ground during the 1977
election, Indira Gandhi was actively trying to garner support from the business community
(Kohli, 1989). As a result when she came back to power in 1980, her government took a more
business friendly stance without making any signiﬁcant changes in policy. This action was meant
to beneﬁt incumbents and was not an embrace of a fully market-driven policy. Consequently,
this small shift in attitude triggered a large productivity response which powered growth in the
1980s. More formal policy changes through economic liberalization took place in 1988 and
1991, which boosted growth in the 1990s, though not everyone agrees with the attitudinal
change-driven growth explanation of the 1980s’ growth. Ahluwalia (2002) and Srinivasan
and Tendulkar (2003) argue that the 1980s’ growth was driven by ﬁscal expansion and was
inherently unstable. Even though supported by data, this explanation ignores the potential
productivity impact of ﬁscal expansion (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004). Indeed the data show
that the ﬁscal expansion and current account deﬁcit wasn’t a one-for-one relationship during
the 1980s, implying that an increase in demand may have played a role in boosting pro-
ductivity.8 Kotwal et al. (2009) presents an excellent account of the literature on economic
liberalization and its impact on economic growth in India.
How and where do institutions ﬁt into this story? Attitudinal change in the 1980s may have
brought about changes in informal institutions and business environment overall. This may
have improved the quality of property rights and contracting institutions adding further into
productivity dividends. After the reforms of 1988 and 1991 the quality of regulatory institutions
improved many-fold. Reforms also had an impact on the quality of property rights institutions.
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2010) expropriation risk index, which is a
measure of property rights institutions, jumped from 6 in 1982 to 10 in 1993 and thereafter. In
fact the eﬀect of liberalization on institutions is even more noticeable when 1991 expropriation
risk is compared with that of 1992. The score jumps from 6.2 to 8.2. This is in line with the
cross-national results of Bhattacharyya (2009b), who shows that liberalization leads to
improvements in institutional quality. Therefore, in summary, institutions improved both in
the 1980s and in the 1990s, a part of the improvement being due to major policy changes.
Attitudinal change, however, also played a role. Improved institutions (especially regulatory
institutions) have had a major impact on productivity and growth performance in India over
the past three decades.
Concluding remarks
A large body of empirical literature emphasizes the role of institutions in long-term economic
development (see Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2004;
Bhattacharyya, 2009a; Bhattacharyya et al., 2009; and many others).9 The institutional aspects
of India’s long-term growth, however, are much less studied. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) are an
exception. They show that the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the British in India
explain variation in long-term development across provinces and regions. In this chapter I have
attempted to integrate the role of institutions in explaining ﬁve centuries of economic growth
Five centuries of economic growth in India
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in India. In order to understand the subtleties of institutional change and its impact on eco-
nomic performance, I chose a descriptive style of presentation. I have argued that during the
pre-modern period India became part of the international trade network after the discovery of
the all-sea route to the east. This led to an unprecedented increase in commerce. India
exported manufactured goods and spices in return for silver and other precious metals. The
rent-seeking state of the time taxed merchant surplus heavily. In return the state hardly
reinvested in public goods or research and development. The majority of this surplus went into
maintaining the army and the conspicuous consumption of the courts. Therefore institutions
were not conducive to long-term economic development or productivity improvement. Then
came the political chaos from the Mughal decline during the eighteenth century which caused
institutions to deteriorate even further. Local rulers resorted to revenue farming, and large-scale
rent seeking weakened economic institutions and stiﬂed economic activities especially in the
farming sector. Moreover, farming productivity experienced signiﬁcant declines due to frequent
droughts and climate shocks, causing grain prices to increase and leading to a secular decline in
grain wages for over a century. Manufacturing became unproﬁtable. During the nineteenth
century the British Crown formally assumed political control of the country and largely con-
tinued with the extractive institutions (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). Then came the globalization
shock to manufacturing. Boosted with a signiﬁcant productivity advantage European manu-
factured goods ﬁrst took over India’s export market and then its domestic market. As a result
India experienced two centuries of deindustrialization, which had a negative impact on long-
term growth. After independence, India’s ﬁrst prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, adopted the
development strategy of protecting domestic capital from foreign competition. Ineﬃcient reg-
ulatory institutions were set up to tackle capital drainage by the private sector. What ensued is
commonly known as the ‘Hindu rate of growth’. The 1980s experienced an attitudinal change
on the part of the government towards private sector. This led to improvements in informal
institutions and subsequent productivity growth. The 1988 and 1991 liberalization reforms
dismantled many of the regulations and improved the quality of regulatory institutions. As a
result, the power of the market was unleashed and India has experienced steady economic
growth since then.
What have we learned from this discussion? It has helped us to create a unifying narrative of
India’s long-term economic growth and to study how institutions may have aﬀected this process.
Narratives by nature are somewhat speculative, though many of the facts presented here are
shared by economic historians and economists. Nevertheless, this chapter raises several questions
and opens up room for further enquiry into this topic.
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Notes
1 China surpassing India during the early 1990s is the only exception.
2 In spite of all its inadequacies, Maddison’s data are useful in understanding the broad picture.
3 This can be in terms of precious metals, army or crops.
4 According to Dutt (1992), many artisans were subjected to ﬂogging, imprisonment and worse. Cutting
oﬀ the thumbs of winders of raw silk has been documented. The domestic demand for textiles also
reduced signiﬁcantly due to the decline of the Indian royal courts, as they were the major buyers of
quality products.
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5 This model goes back to the Permanent Settlement of Bengal between the East India Company
(headed by Lord Cornwallis) and the Bengali landlords concluded in 1793. The agreement between
the two parties was that the landlords would transfer a ﬁxed magnitude of the revenue raised from
land to the Company.
6 A related question is: what types of institution would have dealt with these shocks better? Better
representation of the merchants in royal courts and better property rights may have helped in keeping
taxes low and promoting business-friendly infrastructure investments. However, this area is not covered
in this article and begs further investigation.
7 However, it is important to note that the private sector was not entirely discouraged. In other words,
India never completely went down the socialist path. The idea was to build a mixed economy with
the public sector as the main driver.
8 Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) show that this holds even after adjusting for capacity utilization.
9 Note that Bhattacharyya (2009c) shows that diseases, especially malaria, are an important factors
explaining long-term development in Africa. Further, institutions are statistically insigniﬁcant as an
explanation for this develoment.
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